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Mediation, the Rule of Law, and Dialogue
Nayha Acharya*
In this paper the author urges discussion on the legitimacy of mediation processes, a discussion that 
is not prevalent in legal scholarship. The author argues that mediation outcomes can be inconsistent 
with the rule of law given that the same case can have a different outcome depending on whether it 
is litigated or mediated. On the other hand, crucial and valuable aspects of mediation can result in a 
presumption of legitimacy. With the rule of law critique in mind, the author discusses how dialogue 
theory can be used to improve upon the mediation process. 
The author begins by exploring the value inherent in the rule of law, which poses a conundrum for 
court-annexed mediation because it is not designed to administer law in the same way as adjudication. 
However, this does not make mediation illegitimate. Instead, a framework for mediation can be 
developed to encompass both rule of law values and mediation’s unique characteristics. Mediation 
is not a watered-down version of litigation; it is a distinct process of dialogue that centralizes self-
determination and consensual decision-making. The author then suggests that dialogue theory can 
serve as this grounding framework for mediation. Dialogue theory embraces the values of equality and 
dignity, which underpin the ideals of the rule of law and the key features of mediation. Under this 
framework, mediators must recognize that their primary role is to secure a fair dialogue and not to 
champion a settlement. Where there is hesitancy by one party to accept a settlement, the mediator should 
encourage the party to express their concern rather than forcing the settlement as this facilitates genuine 
dialogue. To ensure fair treatment of members of our communities, the author concludes by urging that 
the mediation process and its legitimacy be more widely discussed given its increased importance in the 
civil litigation system.
*   Assistant Professor at the Schulich School of Law, Dalhousie University, teaching 
Alternative Dispute Resolution, Civil Procedure, and Legal Ethics and Professionalism. I would 
like to thank my research assistants, Erin Mitchell, and Josh Pye for their excellent work. I also 
thank PhD candidate Akinwumi Ogunranti, and Professors Bruce Archibald and Kim Brooks for 
providing very helpful comments on earlier drafts of this piece.
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Introduction
Mediation is gaining increasing relevance in the Canadian civil litigation 
landscape, given its relative speed, inexpensiveness, and simplicity compared 
to what is often seen as a cumbersome formal adjudicative system.1 Access to 
civil justice depends on an efficacious legal system, but the legitimacy of legal 
institutions cannot rest only on efficiency. A good legal system must demand 
that when court-annexed mediation is used, participants are accessing a 
legitimate dispute resolution process, not just a more efficient or a cheaper one. 
Absent an assurance as to the legitimacy of the mediation process, the potential 
for substantive unfairness and procedural impropriety goes dangerously 
unchecked. To avoid this, we need to have a substantiated idea of what 
constitutes legitimate mediation. We must then consider whether Canadian 
mediation programs are indeed legitimate, and if not, we must determine how 
we can make them so. Yet theorization on the legitimacy of mediation processes 
has not seen much scholarly debate in Canada.
In the hope of beginning to fill this gap, I offer a conceptualization of what 
a legitimate court-connected mediation process must entail using dialogue 
theory as a grounding. This provides a starting point for further discussion and 
debate about what constitutes legitimate mediation, and how to operationalize 
it in a Canadian civil justice context. Such discourse is urgent in Canada, given 
that mediation has become intertwined within the civil litigation enterprise.
My starting point is to interrogate a key critique that questions the 
legitimacy of the mediation process on the basis that it is incapable of 
protecting the rule of law. In summary: the propriety of an adjudicative 
outcome depends on its consistency with the rule of law—to
1.  Civil rules in Nova Scotia, Ontario, British Columbia, Alberta, and Quebec provide 
examples of legislated mediation provisions. See e.g. NS, Nova Scotia Civil Procedure Rules, r 10 
[NSCPR]; ON, Rules of Civil Procedure, RRO 1990, Reg 194, rr 24.1, 75.1–75.2; Provincial 
Court Act, RSA 2000, c P-31, ss 65–66; AB, Rules of Court, AR 124/2010, vol 1, r 4.16(1); 
Notice to Mediate (General) Regulation, BC Reg 4/2001, s 3; BC, Supreme Court Civil Rules, 
BC Reg 168/2009, r 9-2; Small Claims Rules, BC Reg 261/93, r 7; Arts 1, 556, 605–619 CCP.
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assess the legitimacy of an adjudicative outcome, the operative question is “were 
the existing laws (including procedural laws) applied properly?” In striking 
contrast, mediation invites participants to pursue a self-determined resolution 
of a dispute through communal formation of fresh norms. Pre-existing norms 
in the form of law may be relevant in the mediation process, but the legitimacy 
of the ultimate mediated outcome does not depend on consistency with law.
When mediating a breach of contract action, for instance, parties may 
be liable to pay damages in law, but may agree to specific performance in a 
mediation. In a personal injury matter, a defendant may realize that the injured 
party is unable to prove causation to a balance of probabilities standard of 
proof but may nonetheless accept responsibility and agree to pay a sum to the 
injured party to aid their recovery. An injured party may be entitled to a greater 
compensatory award in law but may accept a lesser sum in order to resolve the 
dispute faster. An ex-wife in a divorce proceeding may agree to less spousal 
support than she may be entitled to in law and instead gain more child support 
or greater access, and so on.
Such outcomes are inconsistent with the governing legal norms. As such, it 
would be unacceptable for a judge to arrive at these outcomes in an adjudicative 
context, but they are perfectly acceptable outcomes of a mediation process. 
In this sense, the mediated outcome is inconsistent with the rule of law. The 
common response of, “so what, if the parties agree on the outcome?” is not 
enough, because it is difficult to ascertain whether parties really do agree to the 
outcome in a meaningful sense, or whether they were coerced in some way—
either by a more powerful party, or by the reality of being unable to afford 
adjudication. Exacerbating the problem, theoretical and empirical scholarship 
from other jurisdictions, discussed below, suggests that less powerful parties 
(like women or minorities) more readily give up their legal entitlements in 
informal dispute resolution. As such, the rule of law critique is not just an 
abstract theoretical issue—it brings to light that mediation is a potential avenue 
for exploiting vulnerabilities and perpetuating social inequities.
On the other hand, mediation has several crucial, valuable virtues, including 
(but not limited to) its non-adversarial orientation, its increased ability to 
affect uniquely tailored outcomes, and its prioritization of relationships and 
self-determination.2 Recognizing such values, along with its relative efficiency, 
2.  See e.g. Andrew J Pirie, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Skills, Science, and the Law, 
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2000) (discussing adversarial and non-adversarial mindsets in the 
context of dispute resolution at 52–63); Robert A Baruch Bush & Joseph P Folger, The 
Promise of Mediation: The Transformative Approach to Conflict, revised ed (San Francisco: 
Jossey-Bass, 2005) (discussing mediation as being able to provide context-specific outcomes 
at 9–11); Robert A Baruch Bush & Joseph P Folger, “Mediation and Social Justice: Risks and 
Opportunities” (2012) 27:1 Ohio St J Disp Resol 1 [Bush & Folger, "Risks and Opportunities"] 
(highlighting the values of self- determination and inter-party understanding at 33–49).
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can result in a presumption of legitimacy, but this presumption must be 
substantiated.3
 I use the rule of law critique as a starting point for my inquiry into legitimate 
mediation because it is grounded by some of the most central and dearly held 
values within traditional legal systems, and it highlights that mediation is 
starkly and fundamentally different from adjudicative dispute resolution. As I 
explain further below, both concepts are imperative to keep in mind in the task 
of proposing a viable framework for legitimate mediation. The development 
of this framework must involve engaging with the rule of law critique; it must 
demonstrate alertness to the risks that vulnerable parties may face in less formal 
dispute resolution; and it must appreciate the unique value and opportunity 
that mediation can offer.
I open in Part I by considering why the rule of law matters and what 
fundamental values it is designed to protect. Drawing on the insights 
of Lon  Fuller, Joseph Raz, and Jeremy Waldron, I contend that it matters 
because it ensures that legal subjects are treated fairly, with dignity, and as
inherent equals. These values are uncompromisable in any legitimate legal
system. I suggest then, that the legitimacy of a court-connected mediation
Carrie Menkel-Meadow offers a list of values associated with settlement, which may be under-
stood as values that underlie mediation as well: 
Settlement can be justified on its own moral grounds—there are important 
values, consistent with the fundamental values of our legal and political 
systems, that support the legitimacy of settlements of some, if not most, 
legal disputes. These values include consent, participation, empowerment, 
dignity, respect, empathy and emotional catharsis, privacy, efficiency, quality 
solutions, equity, access, and yes, even justice. 
See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, “Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and Democratic 
Defense of Settlement (in Some Cases)” (1995) 83:7 Geo LJ 2663 at 2669–70. For a catalogu-
ing of the values of mediation, see also Law Commission of Canada, Transforming Relation-
ships Through Participatory Justice (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 
2003) at 107–11.
3.  For example, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal’s mediation program is described on its 
websites as promoting resolutions “that can bring more satisfaction to the parties in less time 
and at a lower financial and emotional cost”. See “The Court of Appeal: Judicial Mediation 
Program” (last visited 15 January 2020), online: The Courts of Nova Scotia <courts.ns.ca/
Appeal_Court/NSCA_mediation_program.htm> [perma.cc/HXP5-UL93]; The Canadian 
Judicial Council says that judges as mediators may “help both parties reach an agreement 
by suggesting a settlement”, in order to resolve the dispute in a manner that is “much less 
rigid, cheaper and faster”. See “Alternative to Going to Court” (last visited 15 January 2020), 
online: Canadian Judicial Council <cjc-ccm.ca/en/resources-center/know-your-judicial-system/
alternative-going-court> [perma.cc/DA4D-NPEB].
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process lies in its consistency with the values that inhere in the rule of law. 
This, as I explain, poses a conundrum because mediation, in its very essence, 
is not designed to administer the existing law in the way that adjudication is. 
But, I suggest this does not mean that it is illegitimate to include mediation 
within legal institutions. The goal is to develop a framework for mediation 
that can encompass both rule of law values as well as the key principles that 
make mediation unique, powerful, and valuable. These key principles are self-
determination and autonomous, consensual decision-making.
In Part II, I suggest that a way forward is available through dialogue theory. 
I suggest that Jürgen Habermas’ discourse principles can serve as a helpful 
guiding framework to set out the conditions of legitimate mediation because 
they embody the requisite values of the rule of law (equality and dignity) 
as well as those of mediation (self-determination and consensual decision-
making). Moreover, I explain why conceptualizing mediation as dialogue can 
help the players involved maintain a process that is as responsive as possible to 
the vulnerabilities of parties. Throughout my discussion, I point out debates 
and challenges that can arise in operationalizing the discourse principles as 
constructs of legitimate mediation in the hope that such debates will be carried 
forward in Canada soon.
The main purpose of this paper is to open a debate about how to define a 
legitimate mediation process. The approach I have adopted is to start by setting 
out the long-standing and contemporary issues associated with mediation and 
relating them to the umbrella concern that mediation is not oriented toward 
maintaining the rule of law. I then suggest that dialogue theory can help us 
arrive at a definition of legitimate mediation that can enable a reconciliation 
between the values of mediation and the values of the rule of law. In the end, 
having suggested dialogue theory as a grounding framework for mediation, I 
provide some comments on how a dialogue theory-based conceptualization of 
mediation may inform the practical elements of a mediation program, pointing 
out the continual debates that would, and should, arise in structuring a good 
mediation process. Introducing and moving these debates forward is warranted 
and necessary in the Canadian civil justice scholarly landscape.
I. Exploring the Critique of Mediation as Contrary 
to the Rule of Law
A. The Rule of Law: Why It Matters
The first step in my inquiry is to make explicit why the rule of law matters 
in legal institutions. The rule of law is one of the most pervasive political and 
(2020) 46:1 Queen's LJ74
legal ideals in Western tradition.4 It can mean many things in many contexts, 
but there are some core elements of the rule of law that are generally shared. 
These uncontroversial conceptions of it, especially those that apply in a dispute 
resolution context, are what matter most here.5 Rule of law can be understood 
as having two basic dimensions. The first dimension encompasses the formal 
characteristics of laws and their applicability to legal subjects. Where the rule 
of law is manifest, laws are predictable and certain, and officials (like judges) 
reliably apply and enforce only those rules that have legal validity.6 The principle 
that there must be congruence between the rules that become valid law and
4.  As David Luban notes, references to the rule of law can be traced to Plato’s Laws and 
Aristotle’s Politics. See David Luban, Legal Ethics and Human Dignity (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007) at 99. For a discussion of the historical development of rule of law 
ideas around the world, see Antony Black, A World History of Ancient Political Thought (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009).
5.  In what follows, I present what is sometimes referred to as a “thin” definition of the rule of 
law, which aligns with the jurisprudential writing of theorists like Lon Fuller, Joseph Raz, and 
even Jürgen Habermas. In other work, I have more fully outlined the appeal of the approach that 
Habermas takes to the rule of law and legal legitimacy. See Nayha Acharya, “Deciding ‘What 
Happened?’ When We Don’t Really Know: Finding Theoretical Grounding for Legitimate 
Judicial Fact-Finding” (2020) 33:1 Can JL & Jur 1. Thicker conceptions suggest the inclusion 
of concepts like democracy and human rights within the ideal of the rule of law. I cannot take 
up the propriety of such inclusions here, but for a clear discussion on the matter, see Brian Z 
Tamanaha, “The History and Elements of the Rule of Law” (2012) 2012:2 Sing JLS 232 at 
233–36 [Tamanaha, “History and Elements”]; Lord Bingham, “The Rule of Law” (2007) 66:1 
Cambridge LJ 67 at 75–76. My purpose here is to show that all conceptions of the rule of law, 
thick or thin, will include the elements that I set out as necessary aspects of the rule of law, and 
these uncontroversial elements can helpfully inform a theory of legitimate mediation.
6.  This formulation is paralleled in what Lon Fuller describes as the “internal morality of law”. 
See Lon L Fuller, The Morality of Law, revised ed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964) 
[Fuller, Morality of Law]. Outlining the type of conception of the rule of law suggested above, 
Waldron held that
[a] conception of the Rule of Law like the one just outlined emphasizes the 
virtues that Lon Fuller discussed in The Morality of Law: the prominence 
of general norms as a basis of governance; the clarity, publicity, stability, 
consistency, and prospectivity of those norms; and congruence between the 
law on the books and the way in which public order is actually administered. 
See Jeremy Waldron, “The Concept and the Rule of Law” (2008) 43:1 Ga L Rev 1 at 7. See also 
Joseph Raz, “The Rule of Law and its Virtue” in Joseph Raz, ed, The Authority of Law: Essays on 
Law and Morality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979) 210 at 223.
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their application, administration, and enforcement is particularly relevant to 
judicial dispute resolution and the rule of law critique of mediation. Societies 
that enjoy the rule of law invariably have an adjudicative system whose function 
it is to apply agreed-upon public norms (laws), and only these norms.7 This 
ensures that officials (judges, in the dispute resolution context) are constrained 
by law. As Waldron puts it: 
Most conceptions of [the rule of law] ideal . . . give central 
place to a requirement that people in positions of authority 
should exercise their power within a constraining framework 
of public norms, rather than on the basis of their own 
preferences, their own ideology, or their own individual sense 
of right and wrong.8 
Along with the notion that laws must guide judicial decision-making, the rule 
of law is also used to denote ideals of natural justice or due process in the 
context of the administration of law.9 These procedural principles include a 
right to participate in the decision-making process through the presentation 
of evidence and argumentation, and the right to be heard by a non-biased, 
independent body. Again, Waldron’s articulation is helpful:
[T]he essential idea [of the rule of law] is much more 
than merely functional—applying norms to individual 
cases. . . . Most importantly, it is procedural: the operation of a 
court involves a way of proceeding that offers to those who are 
immediately concerned an opportunity to make submissions 
and present evidence, such evidence being presented in an
7.  This does not mean that in legal systems that espouse rule of law values, the adjudicative 
outcomes are always accurate. Factual uncertainty can result in outcomes being substantively 
inaccurate. What matters is that the system is underpinned by a commitment to applying the 
law as it is to the facts that are ascertained on the relevant legal standard of proof. It would be 
unacceptable for a judge to arrive at a conclusion that is inconsistent with the existing legal 
norms.
8.  Waldron, supra note 6 at 6. This, he notes, is in keeping with Ronald Cass’ comments: “The 
final element of the rule of law, constraint from external authority, like its other elements, helps 
assure that the processes of government, rather than the predilections of the individual decision 
maker, govern.” See Ronald A Cass, The Rule of Law in America (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2001) at 17.
9.  The notion of the rule of law that was popularized by AV Dicey in 1885 focused more squarely 
on this administrative aspect of the rule of law. See AV Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law 
of the Constitution (London, UK: MacMillan and Co, 1885). See also Richard H Fallon Jr, “‘The 
Rule of Law’ as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse” (1977) 97:1 Colum L Rev 1 at 18–19.
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orderly fashion according to strict rules of relevance and 
oriented to the norms whose application is in question. The 
mode of presentation may vary, but the existence of such an 
opportunity does not. . . . Throughout the process, both sides 
are treated respectfully and above all listened to by a tribunal 
that is bound to attend to the evidence presented and respond 
to the submissions that are made in the reasons that are given 
for its eventual decision.10
The rule of law is underpinned by, and assures, important values: equality 
and dignity.11 The value of equality is evident in the commitment to non-
arbitrary treatment by ensuring consistent application of only valid laws. Along 
with equality, the value of respecting dignity is also expressed within the rule 
of law principles. Ensuring that individuals are predictably subjected only to 
existing legal rules allows for people to plan their lives in accordance with the 
law—securing dignity for legal subjects requires such autonomy. Moreover, 
strong connections exist between the procedural aspects of the rule of law 
and the prioritization of human dignity—the right to a fair process and to 
participate in decision-making is rooted in a demand that legal subjects be 
treated as persons who have agency and the capacity to make their case.12
10.  Waldron, supra note 6 at 23. For commentary on the procedural principles that 
complement the formal aspects of the rule of law in an international context, see A Wallace 
Tashima, “The War on Terror and the Rule of Law” (2008) 15:1 Asian American LJ 245. See 
also Brian Z Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004) at 122–26 [Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law]; Tamanaha, “History and 
Elements”, supra note 5.
11.  Some accounts of the rule of law offer different underpinning values, like autonomy and 
agency. In my view, dignity encompasses such values because recognizing a person’s autonomy, 
agency, or capacity is a recognition of their inherent dignity, so I opt for that language instead.
12.  The link between the rule of law and dignity is a prominent theme in many authors’ work. 
See e.g. Raz, supra note 6 (“[r]especting human dignity entails treating humans as persons 
capable of planning and plotting their future” at 221). See also Fuller, Morality of Law, supra 
note 6 (“[e]very departure from the principles of law’s inner morality is an affront to man’s 
dignity as a responsible agent” at 162); David Luban, “The Rule of Law and Human Dignity: 
Re-Examining Fuller’s Canons” (2010) 2:1 Hague J on Rule of L 29 (claiming that Fuller’s
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These assurances give the judicial system legitimacy.13 This legitimacy is 
necessary because judicial outcomes are authoritative. An adjudicative outcome 
binds all parties involved, including the losing party, even in hard cases where
the losing party presented viable and reasonable arguments.14 Free, civil, and 
stable societies require that such authoritative decisions be justified—they 
must deserve their authoritative status. The rule of law principles, through 
their assurance of equal and dignified treatment, can provide this justificatory 
grounding. When a legal institution respects the equality and dignity of the 
people who are subject to it, as evidenced through its commitment to the rule 
of law, the expectation that subjects will respect the authority of the outcomes 
has some grounding.15 Without a commitment to the rule of law, such an 
expectation is unreasonable. This, in my understanding, is why the rule of law 
matters—it assures dignified and equal treatment of legal subjects. True and 
robust adherence to the rule of law endows the authoritative, and even coercive, 
legal system with legitimacy.16
principles make important contributions to protecting human dignity). Additionally, as Jeremy 
Waldron notes:
[L]aw is a mode of governance that deals with people on the basis that they 
have a view of their own to present on the application of the norm to their 
situation; it respects their dignity as beings capable of explaining themselves. 
We can now complement that with the idea that law is inherently respectful 
of persons as agents; it respects the dignity of voluntary action and rational 
self-control.
See Waldron, supra note 6 at 28.
13.  Here, I agree with Rebecca Hollinder-Blumoff and Tom Tyler’s statement: “The rule of law 
fosters legitimacy by equally applying fixed law to all individuals and, in some definitions, respecting 
individuals' rights. Procedural justice promotes legitimacy by giving individuals a neutral and 
trustworthy decision maker, allowing them a voice, and treating them with courtesy and respect.” 
See Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Tom R Tyler, “Procedural Justice and the Rule of Law: 
Fostering Legitimacy in Alternative Dispute Resolution” (2011) 2011:1 J Disp Resol 1 at 9–10.
14.   For my take on the relationships between legitimacy and authority in an adjudicative 
context, see Acharya, supra note 5.
15.  The ideas that (1) judicial outcomes must be authoritative and must simultaneously be 
justifiable such that their authority (and demand for obedience) is grounded, and (2) that such 
justification may be found in formal or procedural aspects of the rule of law, have roots in the 
jurisprudential thinking of Jürgen Habermas. Habermas notes that: “On the one hand, established 
law guarantees the enforcement of legally expected behavior and therewith the certainty of law. 
On the other hand, rational procedures for making and applying law promise to legitimate 
the expectations that are stabilized in this way; the norms deserve legal obedience.” See Jürgen 
Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, 
translated by William Rehg (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1996) at 198 [Habermas, Facts
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Locating legitimacy in mediation engages a different conversation because 
parties come to their own resolution as opposed to having one authoritatively 
imposed on them, as in adjudication. That a mediated outcome is the product 
of the parties’ agreement may lead to the conclusion that no further inquiry into 
the legitimacy of the outcome is warranted—presumably, the impacted parties 
agree to its legitimacy, so it may seem redundant, and even compromising to 
the parties’ self-determination, to seek additional reasons for its legitimacy. 
Coupled with discontent over the inaccessibility of the judicial system, such 
ideas about the inherent legitimacy of mediated outcomes have undoubtably 
played a role in its enthusiastic embrace within Canadian civil litigation.17
But many have cautioned against draping a false cloak of legitimacy over 
mediation, especially considering its potentially dangerous undermining of the 
rule of law. In the name of values like self-determination, harmony, cooperation, 
relationship preservation, and efficiency, critics argue that proponents make 
and Norms] [emphasis in original]. Similarly, Lon Fuller also suggests that law must deserve 
its authoritative demand and posits that law earns its authoritative quality when there is a 
reciprocal relationship between lawmakers and those governed. That reciprocal relationship, 
as represented by his internal morality principles, provides a reason for why legal subjects can 
reasonably assent to the law’s authority. See Fuller, Morality of Law, supra note 6. Fuller notes, 
“there is a kind of reciprocity between government and the citizen with respect to the observance 
of rules. . . . When this bond of reciprocity is finally and completely ruptured by government, 
nothing is left on which to ground the citizen’s duty to observe the rules” (ibid at 39–40).
16.  Two clarifications are relevant at this juncture: first, the idea that the rule of law 
confers legitimacy on legal principles is not to suggest that rule of law principles are actually 
operationalized in every legal system that purports to hold them dear. Certainly, the access to 
justice crisis which prevents individuals from truly participating in the legal system (which led, at 
least in part, to the surge in popularity of ADR) does constitute a compromise to the rule of law. 
My purpose is not to minimize the practical challenges associated with adjudication, but to come 
to an understanding of what role the rule of law, as a principle, plays in the adjudicative context 
in order to respond to the critique that the rule of law plays a problematically lesser role in 
mediation. Second, the notion that the rule of law is a source of legitimacy for legal systems 
does not suggest that adherence to the rule of law ensures absolute justice or invariably good 
decisions. As Tamanaha puts it, “[t]he rule of law cannot be about everything good that people 
desire from government.” See Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law, supra note 10 at 113. Legitimacy 
does not imply perfection, and there are limits to what can be achieved by any institution. 
But those limits do not, in my view, result in illegitimacy. For a discussion on the concept of 
legitimacy in an imperfect adjudicative system more fully, see Acharya, supra note 5. In my 
discussion below, I discuss the limitations of the rule of law and how those limitations are 
relevant to responding to the critique of mediation rooted in commitment to the rule of law.
17.  As Jacqueline Nolan-Haley remarks, “[t]he trend toward court mediation is remarkable 
because our civil justice system has traditionally promised justice through law. The promise 
of mediation is different: Justice is derived, not through the operation of law, but through
N. Acharya 79
mediation out to be inherently more enlightened than the slow, adversarial, and 
heavy-handed adjudicative system. In doing so, they problematically belittle 
the values that inhere in the legal system through adherence to the rule of law 
and the protection of legal rights, and they over-prioritize settlement between 
parties.
These cautions have been expressed rigorously by scholars, theoreticians, 
judges, and even practitioners of meditation. Owen Fiss offered one of the 
most famous critiques in his piece, “Against Settlement”. There, he writes:
Parties might settle while leaving justice undone. . . . Although 
the parties are prepared to live under the terms they bargained 
for, and although such peaceful coexistence may be a necessary 
precondition of justice, and itself a state of affairs to be valued, 
it is not justice itself. To settle for something means to accept 
less than some ideal.18 
With similar sentiments, Laura Nader has called for alertness to the darker side 
of what she calls “harmony ideology”.19 She contends that the rise of alternative 
dispute resolution (ADR) is best understood as an ideological attempt to 
de-emphasize justice and rights and replace them with harmony.20 But, as is 
implicit in Fiss’ comments above, striving for harmony is not inherently better 
than striving for justice or protection of legal rights and, in fact, can be harmful.
This harm becomes clearer in light of evidence that weaker, more disadvantaged 
parties bear a greater burden when it comes to securing harmony. For decades, 
scholars have been calling attention to the disadvantages faced by vulnerable 
parties in informal dispute resolution contexts. In 1985, on the heels of Fiss’ 
critique, Richard Delgado et al cautioned about the dangers that racial minorities 
and economically disadvantaged parties face in mediation.21 In 1991, Trina
autonomy and self-determination.” See Jacqueline M Nolan-Haley, “Court Mediation and the 
Search for Justice Through Law” (1996) 74:1 Wash ULQ 47 at 49.
18.  Owen M Fiss, “Against Settlement” (1984) 93:6 Yale LJ 1073 at 1085–86.
19.  See Laura Nader, “Controlling Processes in the Practice of Law: Hierarchy and Pacification 
in the Movement to Re-Form Dispute Ideology” (1993) 9:1 Ohio St J Disp Resol 1 [Nader, 
“Controlling Processes”]; Laura Nader, Harmony Ideology: Justice and Control in a Zapotec 
Mountain Village (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990).
20.  See Nader, “Controlling Processes”, supra note 19. Nader notes: “A movement to control 
litigation was being constructed to replace justice and rights talk with what I call harmony 
ideology, the belief that harmony in the guise of compromise or agreement is ipso facto better 
than an adversary posture” (ibid at 3).
21.  See Richard Delgado et al, “Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in 
Alternative Dispute Resolution” (1985) 1985:6 Wis L Rev 1359 at 1359–63.
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Grillo authored an important and compelling critique, explaining that in the 
family law context, women can be easily manipulated into “consensually” 
giving up their rights.22 In 2017, Delgado again voiced the same concerns, 
pointing to empirical studies showing that disadvantaged parties tend to secure 
worse outcomes in informal contexts than their counterparts who are generally 
more powerful in society.23
Several hypotheses exist for why these disadvantages perpetuate in mediation 
and negotiation situations. Delgado’s theory is that in the informal context, 
familiar roles of dominance can, and do, easily manifest, while within formal 
contexts their emergence is less likely:
Indeed, the comfortable setting and informal atmosphere 
instead provide an ideal situation for the stronger actor to 
behave in his usual confident fashion and expect the mediator 
to enact his wishes, as well. He is apt to speak forthrightly, as 
though his account of things is the only possible one. His body 
language and manner will signal to onlookers that he expects 
to secure a favorable outcome. The woman or minority group
22.  See Trina Grillo, “The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women” (1991) 100:6 
Yale LJ 1545. See also Linda Babcock & Sara Laschever, Women Don’t Ask: Negotiation and 
the Gender Divide (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003); Penelope E Bryan, “Killing 
Us Softly: Divorce Mediation and the Politics of Power” (1992) 40:2 Buff L Rev 441; Isabelle 
R Gunning, “Diversity Issues in Mediation: Controlling Negative Cultural Myths” (1995) 
1995:1 J Disp Resol 55. Cf Daniel Del Gobbo, “The Feminist Negotiator’s Dilemma” (2018) 
33:1 Ohio St J Disp Resol 1 (the author catalogues the research done on gender difference in 
negotiation and challenges the narrative that there is a typically female manner of negotiating 
that tends to disadvantage women).
23.  See Richard Delgado, “Alternative Dispute Resolution: A Critical Reconsideration” (2017) 
70:3 SMU L Rev 595 at 597–99. For a sampling of those empirical studies, see ibid at 597–
98, nn 22, 28. Notably, a study by Gary LaFree and Christine Rack found that women and 
minorities seeking smaller awards typically faired better in litigation as compared to mediation. 
See Gary LaFree & Christine Rack, “The Effects of Participants’ Ethnicity and Gender on 
Monetary Outcomes in Mediated and Adjudicated Civil Cases” (1996) 30:4 Law & Soc’y 
Rev 767 at 776–89, cited in Delgado, supra note 23 at 598, n 28. Similarly, Christine Rack 
found that when minorities where negotiating with other minorities their claims tended to 
begin lower than when a white party was negotiating with a minority. See Christine Rack, 
“Negotiated Justice: Gender & Ethnic Minority Bargaining Patterns in the Metrocourt Study” 
(1999) 20:2 Hamline J Pub L & Pol’y 211 at 217–18, cited in Delgado, supra note 23 at 598, 
n 28. Finally, Ian Ayres found that automobile salespersons typically offered women worse 
deals than they offered men due to the perception that women did not know any better. See 
Ian Ayres, “Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations” (1991) 
104:4 Harv L Rev 817 at 818–20, cited in Delgado, supra note 23 at 597, n 22.
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member may well sense the prevailing atmosphere with its 
familiar expectations and not put his or her case forward as 
forcefully as it might merit.24
Delgado’s theory seems viable. Protection of legal entitlements is not 
prioritized in informal dispute resolution as much as coming to a compromise. 
But, as Delgado notes, it is more likely that the less powerful party does the 
compromising, simply, and problematically, because they are more accustomed 
to it. Moreover, they are more likely to be overtly or subtly encouraged by the 
mediator to do so. For instance, women may be disproportionately encouraged to 
“act like women”—to refrain from anger and to accept compromise.25 Similarly, 
mediators that share characteristics with one of the parties are more likely to give 
that party more time to speak, and to validate their positions, thus encouraging 
the other party to abandon or at least soften theirs, or accept narratives about 
themselves that portray stereotypical and prejudiced attitudes.26 Aggravating 
the problem even more, since successful mediation is often construed as 
achieving a settlement, mediators are incentivized to push parties toward 
settlement, without as much concern for the substance of the settlement.27
Fundamentally, critics demand recognition that it is erroneous to assume 
that a mediation is good or successful simply because parties have reached a 
resolution, because that resolution may be unjust, even though the parties 
24.  Richard Delgado, “The Unbearable Lightness of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Critical 
Thoughts on Fairness and Formality” (2017) 70:3 SMU L Rev 611 at 621.
25.  See Grillo, supra note 22.
26.  Isabelle Gunning writes that mediators draw from their own experiences (or cultural myths) 
to understand the dispute and the narratives of the parties. See Gunning, supra note 22 at 68–70. 
She also writes that while adversarial courtroom advocacy is meant to distance the parties and 
prevent the parties from valuing their relationship over their self-interest, courtroom adjudication 
is not without unconscious or systemic racism either. In this context, prejudice manifests itself in 
both the operation of formal rules and in biased attitudes masked by codewords (see ibid at 63–65).
27.  For instance, James Coben and Penelope Harley claim that the institutionalization of 
mediation has moved its primary goal away from community empowerment and toward the 
efficient settlement of disputes. See James Coben & Penelope Harley, “Intentional Conversations 
About Restorative Justice, Mediation and the Practice of Law” (2004) 25:2 Hamline J Pub L & 
Pol’y 235 at 257–58. Nancy Welsh describes court-connected mediation as especially evaluative 
or coercive, with a mediator’s success measured in the number of cases they successfully settle. 
See Nancy A Welsh, “You’ve Got Your Mother’s Laugh: What Bankruptcy Mediation Can 
Learn from the Her/History of Divorce and Child Custody Mediation” (2009) 17:2 Am Bankr 
Inst L Rev 427 at 438–39 [Welsh, “Bankruptcy Mediation”]. Robert A Baruch Bush details the 
institutionalization of mediation in the late 1990s, writing that increased connection with the 
courts had made mediation more coercive. Community mediation centres and divorce mediators 
also seemed to remain settlement-oriented, even when they attempted to distance themselves
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seem, on the surface, to have consented to it.28 The realities of mediation that
they point to are unsettling and need to be taken seriously, especially given 
that mediation is being increasingly integrated into civil justice. Invoking the 
mantra that mediation is cheaper, faster, and simpler offers no satisfactory 
response. Rather, what is needed is serious engagement with the question of 
how legitimate mediation can be defined, such that concerns associated with 
de-prioritization of the rule of law are taken into account.
B. Responding to Rule of Law Concerns
The first step toward a theory of legitimate mediation that is responsive to 
rule of law concerns requires maintaining clarity on what the normative load 
of the rule of law really is and its limits. It is helpful to begin by imagining 
a situation where a patient is misdiagnosed by her doctor resulting in 
delayed treatment. She cannot, however, prove on a balance of probabilities 
that the doctor’s misdiagnosis constituted a breach of the standard of care. 
If a judge  nonetheless awards compensation, the outcome is illegitimate 
because it is contrary to the pre-existing legal principle that injuries are 
only compensable if negligence (i.e., breach of the standard of care) can be 
proven on a balance of probabilities. Of course, there are hard cases where the 
legal rules are unclear and their interpretation is debatable, but at the heart 
of the debate is securing the best interpretation of the existing law so that 
it can be applied to the facts of the case.29 Otherwise, adjudication fails to 
uphold the rule of law, and its processes and outcomes cannot be legitimate.
Mediation, on the other hand, is a process that should enable mutual 
creation of fresh norms that will then guide the parties’ own resolution of 
the dispute. As Fuller puts it, “mediation is commonly directed, not toward 
achieving conformity to norms, but toward the creation of the relevant 
norms themselves”.30 In other words, the parties themselves will decide what
from the courts. See Robert A Baruch Bush, “Staying in Orbit, or Breaking Free: The Relationship 
of Mediation to the Courts over Four Decades” (2008) 84:3 NDL Rev 705 at 727–30.
28.  In addition to those otherwise noted, for other prominent critics see e.g. Harry T 
Edwards, “Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?” (1986) 99:3 Harv L Rev 
668 at 675–82; Judith Resnik, “Procedure’s Projects” (2004) 23 CJQ 273 at 276; David Luban, 
“Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm” (1995) 83:7 Geo LJ 2619 at 2622–23.
29.  Ronald Dworkin popularized the phrase “hard cases” when referring to cases of legal 
indeterminacy, and the hard task of resolving that indeterminacy to come to a judicial 
conclusion. See Ronald Dworkin, “Hard Cases” (1975) 88:6 Harv L Rev 1057.
30.  Lon Fuller, “Mediation—Its Forms and Functions” in Kenneth I Winston, ed, The 
Principles of Social Order (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1981) 125 at 128. See also 
ibid at 144–45.
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principles matter and therefore what they should do. As such, in a mediation 
context, while the existing legal rules may be relevant, they do not dictate the 
validity of the outcome. Unlike adjudication, a valid mediated outcome may 
be inconsistent with the rules that are set out in the law. For instance, consider 
the above example of the patient who suffers a medical misdiagnosis and delay 
in treatment. Parties may agree that she is entitled to some compensation and
their resolution may reflect this, even though at law she may not be so entitled.31 
Accordingly, while a mediated outcome may be consistent with legal norms, it 
does not have to be. So, securing the rule of law in the sense of ensuring that the 
existing laws are administered and enforced cannot be accomplished through 
mediation. For that, an authoritative adjudication process is necessary. This 
is an important recognition, and one of which proponents of mediation and 
reformers of civil justice must always remain aware. 
But none of this necessitates the conclusion that adjudication is the only 
viable and just dispute resolution process and that mediation is irredeemable. 
Such a conclusion depends on the false premise that just or good outcomes 
can only be those that are consistent with existing law. This cannot be true, 
particularly  in post-traditional, pluralistic societies.32 What the law should be, 
and indeed even what the law is, is often indeterminate, and multiple viable 
interpretations will exist. Ultimately, one interpretation wins the day, but this 
does not mean that the other interpretations or other norms are inherently bad 
or unjust; it means that they do not become valid law.33 This recognition yields 
an understanding of the normative limits of the rule of law. Take for example 
debates around legalization of cannabis. There are surely viable arguments on 
both sides. In some societies, the pro-legalization side won the day, and in 
others, the pro-criminalization side won the day, at least for now. A judge in the 
first society must not find a person guilty of a crime if they smoke recreational 
cannabis—this would be an illegitimate finding. In the second society, a judge 
must find a recreational smoker guilty of a crime, and failure to do so would
31.  As noted by the Law Commission of Canada: “A degree of flexibility over the distribution 
of responsibility is possible in a consensus-based justice process. This type of flexibility does not 
always exist in a conventional litigation model. A consensus-based justice approach to conflict 
enables factors to be taken into account in responsibility allocation beyond what formal rules of 
law might suggest.” See Law Commission of Canada, supra note 2 at 105.
32.  See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, “The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Postmodern, 
Multicultural World” (1996) 38:1 Wm & Mary L Rev 5. For similar sentiments, see also Maria 
Antonietta Foddai, “Mediation on Trial: Incongruencies Within a Traditional Legal Paradigm” 
(2014) 4:1 J Arbitration & Mediation 123.
33.  For jurisprudential expression of this idea, see e.g. Habermas, Facts and Norms, supra 
note 15 at ch 5. Further, he states: “In a pluralistic society in which various belief systems 
compete with each other, recourse to a prevailing ethos . . . does not offer a convincing basis for 
legal discourse” (ibid at 200). Similar ideas have been expressed in the context of democratic 
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constitute an illegitimate outcome. An application of the existing rules will be 
valid in either society, even though the law is substantively different in both. 
The validity of the outcomes is not derived because of any necessary moral 
superiority of one rule—if this were the case, then only one of the societies 
would end up with a legitimate outcome. But both outcomes are legitimate in 
that both secure the rule of law in that particular society.
This legitimacy is not derived from the moral “rightness” or superiority 
of the law itself. The rule of law cannot, and does not, make this normative 
promise. Rather, it secures legitimacy because it ensures that people are not 
subjected to arbitrary exercise of authoritative power and that legal subjects are 
treated as equals and with dignity, as discussed previously.
But this simply does not mean that the only just, fair, or good resolution is 
one that is secured through the rule of law, as in adjudication. In fact, as Carrie 
Menkel-Meadow has pointed out, sometimes mediated outcomes are better 
than potential adjudicative outcomes precisely because they are inconsistent 
with legal rules.34 In the medical misdiagnosis situation described above, for 
example, many would say that compensating a patient for a misdiagnosis is 
a better outcome than awarding no compensation, which is the legitimate 
outcome that the adjudicative process would yield through an application of 
the existing tort law framework.
legitimacy. David Estlund writes: 
[I]n a diverse community there is bound to be little agreement on whether 
a decision is legitimate, since there will be little agreement about whether 
it meets the independent standard of, say, justice. If the decision is made 
by majority rule, and voters address the question whether the proposal 
would be independently correct, then at least a majority will accept its 
correctness. However, nearly half of the voters might deny its correctness, 
and on a correctness theory they would in turn deny the legitimacy of the 
decision—deny that it warrants state action, and/or places them under 
any obligation to comply. Brute disagreement of this kind raises pragmatic 
questions about how to maintain stability. A morally deeper worry stems 
from the fact that much of the disagreement might be reasonable, or in our 
more generic term, qualified. First, there might be qualified disagreement 
on what counts as just. Second, even if there is an account of justice that is 
beyond qualified objection, I assume there will be qualified disagreement in 
many cases about what actual decisions and institutions meet the agreeable 
principles of justice.
See David M Estlund, Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2008) at 99.
34.  See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 2 at 2676.
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The rule of law provides the adjudicative system with institutional legitimacy, 
but it does not result in the adjudicative system and its outcomes being infallible 
and invariably just.35 Adherence to the rule of law assures that although the 
legal system (or any institution) cannot promise absolute justice, the values 
of protecting and recognizing the equality and dignity of legal subjects lie at 
the heart of the system, and this maintains its goodness.36 Similarly, although 
mediation is not oriented toward applying pre-existing laws to resolve disputes, 
it can nonetheless have institutional legitimacy, just as adjudication can, as long 
as the same fundamental values that underlie the rule of law and adjudicative 
legitimacy are expressed within the mediation process.
The task, then, is to establish a framework for legitimate mediation that 
holds at its core the values of equality and dignity, along with the values inherent 
to mediation—recognition that parties are capable of engaging in consensual, 
mutual ordering and a recognition of their right to self-determine the resolution 
of their dispute in accordance with the norms that they themselves create.
Dialogue theory is well suited to provide such theoretical rooting for 
legitimate mediation because, as I explain below, conceptualizing mediation 
through dialogue theory can create space for all the above noted values, and 
can orient the mediation process and players within it to become increasingly 
responsive to the concerns raised by critics, explained above. In the next 
section, I offer some preliminary thoughts on how mediation can be theorized 
as dialogue and why it would be beneficial to do so. My hope is that my 
comments here initiate further debate about the wisdom of conceptualizing 
mediation as dialogue and about the nuances of what it means for mediation 
to be a good dialogue.
II. Mediation as Dialogue
The concept of dialogue has been theorized by philosophers and theorists of 
education, psychology, ethics, and more.37 Though many unique contributions 
as to what constitutes dialogue and what its utility is have been offered, a 
common theme is that a true dialogue is an authentic commitment to co-
creation of meaning through mutual contribution and understanding. In the 
context of conflict, David Bohm, for instance, suggests that dialogue can help
35.   For an accessible and succinct discussion of  the value and limitations of the rule of law, 
see Tamanaha, “History and Elements”, supra note 5.
36.  For a fulsome argument on this point, see Acharya, supra note 5.
37.  Contemporary dialogue theory is usually attributed to Martin Buber. See Martin Buber, 
I and Thou, translated by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1970). See 
also Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, translated by Myra Bergman Ramos (New York: 
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participants come to a new and authentically shared understanding, even (and 
maybe especially) when there is a history of tension or conflict between them.38
Given that mediation is a dispute resolution process that involves mutual 
norm creation through communal engagement among parties, concepts of 
dialogue can helpfully inform a theory of good mediation.39 Three crucial 
questions are key in furthering the task of using dialogue theory as a conceptual 
grounding for court-annexed mediation:
i.  What constitutes a genuine dialogue? (What does a good dialogue 
look like? What are its conditions?)
ii. Why is a good dialogue good? (What values are expressed in the concept 
of dialogue, and particularly, how are the values of equality, dignity, 
self-determination, and autonomous decision-making represented in 
the conditions of a good dialogue?)
iii. How can dialogue theory be operationalized in practice? (How can the 
idea of mediation-as-dialogue be used as a practical guide for securing 
a space for legitimate mediation? What are the implications for how 
mediators, parties, and party’s representatives should behave in order 
to engage in a dialogical mediation? What structures should be in 
place to enable mediation as dialogue?)
Many theorists of dialogue discuss its benefits, but there is less direct 
discussion about its actual conditions—what would a genuine dialogue look 
like? How does it come about? To approach this question, I turn to Habermas’ 
jurisprudential ideas, which offer a rich theory of dialogue within the context 
of a legal system. For Habermas, when legal decisions occur through a process
Continuum Publishing Company, 1970); Nel Noddings, Caring: A Feminine Approach to 
Ethics and Moral Education (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984); David Bohm, On 
Dialogue (New York: Routledge Classics, 2010); Michael Paquette, Erich J Sommerfeldt & 
Michael L Kent, “Do the Ends Justify the Means? Dialogue, Development Communication, 
and Deontological Ethics” (2015) 41:1 Public Relations Rev 30.
38.  See Bohm, supra note 37.
39.  See e.g. Ted Lewis & Mark Umbreit, “A Humanistic Approach to Mediation and Dialogue: 
An Evolving Transformative Practice” (2015) 33:1 Conflict Resolution Q 3 (advocating that 
approaching mediation through the lens of dialogue best maximizes the human potential of 
genuine mutual understanding). See also Stephen Chilton & Maria Stalzer Wyant Cuzzo, 
“Habermas’s Theory of Communicative Action as a Theoretical Framework for Mediation 
Practice” (2005) 22:3 Conflict Resolution Q 325.
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that best approximates the conditions of what he calls a “rational discourse”, the 
emergent outcome can be considered valid and legitimate.40 In the adjudicative 
context, this means that if the litigants were able to participate in a rational 
discourse process, and the adjudicative outcome is a product of that process, 
then the outcome is legitimate.41 That is, the legitimacy of the outcome is derived 
from the fact that the process involved a fair and good discourse. What, then, 
constitutes such a discourse? As I have noted elsewhere, Solum has helpfully 
defined the necessary conditions of rational discourse in a formulation that was 
originally suggested by Robert Alexy, and then adopted by Habermas.42 Solum’s 
presentation of the conditions of rational discourse is as follows:
i. Rule of Participation: Each person who is capable of 
engaging in communication and action is allowed to 
participate. 
ii. Rule of Equality of Communicative Opportunity: Each 
participant is given equal opportunity to communicate 
with respect to the following:
a. Each participant is allowed to call into question 
any proposal;
b. Each participant is allowed to introduce any 
proposal into the discourse; and
c. Each participant is allowed to express attitudes, 
sincere beliefs, wishes, and needs.
iii. Rule Against Compulsion: No participant may be 
hindered by compulsion—whether arising from inside 
the discourse or outside of it—from making use of the 
rules secured under (1) and (2).43
For Habermas, then, to the extent that discourse principles are approximated 
within adjudicative structures, such that the conditions of participation and 
non-coercion are respected, the process and outcomes that emerge from it can 
be considered legitimate.
40.  See Habermas, Facts and Norms, supra note 15.
41.  See ibid at ch 5.
42.  See Acharya, supra note 5.
43.  Lawrence B Solum, “Procedural Justice” (2004) 78:1 S Cal L Rev 181 at 269–70.
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But why does adherence to these discourse principles result in legitimizing 
the resolution? These discursive principles can do the normative work of giving 
legitimacy to an outcome because they are value-laden. Where law emerges 
through a process that embodies the principles of rational discourse, affected 
parties are entitled to an equal right to voice their viewpoints and arguments 
freely and meaningfully. This provides a justifiable reason, grounded in the 
fairness and justifiability of the process, for the participants to recognize the 
legitimacy of the resolution.44
The discourse principles are valuable in the enterprise of setting out legitimate 
dispute resolution in the mediation context because they give simultaneous 
expression to the values that underlie the rule of law and the fundamental 
features of mediation. The values of equality and dignified treatment of parties 
are represented in the ideals of equal participation and equal communicative 
opportunity, as well as the rule against coercion. Moreover, self-determination 
is foundational to dialogue because its very purpose is to ultimately arrive, 
together, at an authentic, uncoerced, non-imposed outcome. In addition, there 
is no demand to apply any predetermined norms. Rather, the conditions of 
discourse carve out a space for parties to co-create the norms through a fair 
dialogue. As such, I gratefully commend Chilton and Cuzzo for seeing and 
writing about the value of Habermas’ principles as a framework for mediation.45 
The concept of dialogue, emboldened by Habermas’ principles of discourse, 
provides a promising scaffolding for defining what constitutes legitimate 
mediation. It would give rise to a model that is rooted in values that go beyond 
efficiency, and that resonates with the values of the rule of law and simultaneously 
provides expression for appreciating mediation as a dialogue oriented 
toward mutual understanding, and, ultimately, a self-determined outcome.
This leads to the third and most difficult question—how can the theory of an 
ideal dialogue be translated into a practical framework for assessing, reforming, 
and creating legitimate mediation programs in Canadian civil justice? In my 
comments below, I indicate challenges and points of debate that would, and 
44.  See Habermas, Facts and Norms, supra note 15 at 197–98. Tom Tyler’s work with respect 
to the relationship between participation and legitimacy is well known. See e.g. Tom R Tyler, 
“The Psychological Consequences of Judicial Procedures: Implications for Civil Commitment 
Hearings” (1992) 46:2 SMU L Rev 433; Tom R Tyler, “What is Procedural Justice?: Criteria 
Used by Citizens to Assess the Fairness of Legal Procedures” (1988) 22 Law & Soc’y Rev 103; 
Hollander-Blumoff & Tyler, supra note 13.
45.  See Chilton & Cuzzo, supra note 39. Readers should see Chilton and Cuzzo for a more 
detailed look at Habermas’ theories of linguistic presuppositions of communicative action and 
the authors’ take on how these presuppositions can be used to inform what mediators should 
do. Although Chilton and Cuzzo do not link their analysis to the rule of law, as I attempt here, 
I find their insights into how mediation can and should be informed by Habermas' theory to be 
valuable and entirely complimentary to what I have tried to offer here.
N. Acharya 89
should, arise in giving as full an expression to each of the discourse principles as 
possible within a mediation process. My purpose here is not to resolve all these 
debates because that cannot be done single-handedly; my goal is to suggest that 
these are valuable debates that must be on our civil justice agenda in Canada as 
we assess and reform our mediation processes.
A. Rule of Participation
Naturally, a mediation process must be structured in a way that allows parties 
who have an interest in the outcome to be present and able to participate. The 
availability of translators and other aids is an obvious condition that is necessary 
to ensure that individual communicative needs are met, but there are additional 
questions that can arise in assessing whether a mediation program best meets 
this condition.46 For instance, this condition invokes questions around who 
should have a seat at the mediation. It cannot be the case that any person can 
participate—individuals must have some relationship to the issue at hand, but, 
of course, the precise nature of the requisite relationship may be debatable. 
Surely, a mediation process does not need standing requirements equivalent 
to adjudication contexts. The key is that assessing mediation programs must 
involve considerations of who can be allowed to participate and why.
In addition, it may be worth recognizing that allowing additional 
participants may even improve the communicative capacity (and therefore 
ability to fully participate) of the directly affected parties. This has been 
recognized in the Nova Scotia Family Law Mediation program, which allows 
parties to request a support person to attend their mediation with them.47 
Support persons are often family members and they assist the primary party in 
communicating comfortably. This can be a useful mechanism for improving a 
party’s communicative capacity and their ability to meaningfully participate in 
the dialogue. This relates closely with the second dialogical condition discussed 
below.
B. Rule of Equality of Communicative Opportunity48
Assessing a mediation program on the criterion of ensuring equal 
communicative opportunity must involve a nuanced consideration of varied
46.  For comments on making mediation accessible to people with disabilities, see Martha E 
Simmons, “One Mediation, Accessible to All”, Dispute Resolution Magazine 23:1 (Fall 2016) 23.
47.  See “Mediation” (last modified 27 March 2020), online: Family Law Nova Scotia <www.
nsfamilylaw.ca/services/court/mediation> [perma.cc/TKX7-6Z9J].
48.  See Chilton & Cuzzo, “Habermas’s Theory”, supra note 39. The authors offer an insightful 
discussion on the value of allowing and enabling parties to ask one another questions. They
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forms of communication and a determination of whether the mediation 
process makes space for that variance. This challenge brings to mind critics of 
Habermas’ theory of rational discourse who complain that his prioritization of 
rationality as a guiding light for participants in an authentic discourse is both 
Eurocentric and male-centric. They suggest that the centrality of rationality 
improperly assumes that the only valid way to persuade one another is through 
logic and reason, yet many people and cultures use other means, like stories, 
narrations, or emotive expressions to convey meaning.49 The emphasis on 
rationality in Habermas’ theory may minimize and even exclude this type 
of communication.  Such exclusion would constitute a compromise to the 
second condition of equal communicative opportunity. In the mediation 
sphere, this concern most obviously manifests as a form of mediator bias. As 
noted above, a mediator may give more validation and more time to speak to 
someone whose manner of speaking and expressing themselves is more relatable 
to that mediator.50 Assessment of mediation programs must include finding 
ways to determine and continually re-assess whether such mediator biases are 
influencing the participants’ communicative opportunity. Subtle demands 
for Euro- or male-typical rationality should be understood and recognized 
by mediators and representatives in a mediation, and thereby minimized.
Rationality can, however, be interpreted broadly, and in some important 
respects, rationality may be considered valuable. First, there is no reason to think 
that telling a story, relating a personal narrative, or recognizing and expressing 
the emotional aspects of a conflict are irrational. Rather, such discursive
particularly focus on the idea that questions allow for open and authentic communication 
and genuine listening, and can thereby foster the relationship-building goal of mediation. 
“Mediators”, they suggest, “can serve as a guides to reinstate and reinforce the inherent value of 
the question” (ibid at 17).
49.  See Mojca Pajnik, “Feminist Reflections on Habermas’s Communicative Action: The 
Need for an Inclusive Political Theory” (2006) 9:3 European J Soc Theory 385, citing Jane 
Braaten, “From Communicative Rationality to Communicative Thinking: A Basis for Feminist 
Theory and Practice” in Johanna Meehan, ed, Feminists Read Habermas: Gendering the Subject of 
Discourse (New York: Routledge, 1995) 139, Simone Chambers, “Feminist Discourse/Practical 
Discourse” in Johanna Meehan, ed, Feminists Read Habermas: Gendering the Subject of Discourse 
(New York: Routledge, 1995) 163, Carol C Gould, Rethinking Democracy: Freedom and Social 
Cooperation in Politics, Economy, and Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 
and Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
50.  See e.g. Gunning, supra note 22 (showing that minority parties may adopt narratives that 
are more in line with the mediator’s bias). See also Grillo, supra note 22 (noting that women are 
often disallowed, in various ways, to express emotions like anger, because they are considered 
unfeminine).
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elements would add to the richness of the dialogue and help participants to 
understand the dispute from the other’s perspective.51
Secondly, mediators may help parties avoid some of the pitfalls of irrationality 
that we are all prone to and enable a better understanding among parties. Roger 
Fisher and William Ury are famous proponents of recognizing that human 
elements, like our propensity to “get angry, depressed, fearful, hostile, frustrated, 
and offended”, can prevent rational exploration of a problem.52 So can our 
tendency of allowing our egos to become irrationally attached to a position that 
we take, which makes wise reconciliation and agreement less likely.53 A good 
mediator should be able to help parties move past these “people problems”, as 
Fisher and Ury call them.54 They offer valuable methods for how negotiators 
may do so in their well-known approach to principled negotiation outlined in 
their book, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In. The most 
central idea is to avoid over-commitment to positions by focusing instead on the 
interests that underlie the parties’ positions.55 By doing so, parties are in a better 
position to rationally determine whether they have mutual or complementary 
interests and may be able find ways to maximize the realization of as many 
interests as possible of all parties. Mediators would do well to adopt the concepts 
of principled negotiation to help parties achieve rationally motivated outcomes.
Finally, rationality may reasonably be taken to imply that participants be 
willing to provide reasons for their claims and positions, and to that extent 
it is valuable, because it would help to maintain authenticity and sincerity 
in the dialogue. Through dialogue wherein both parties are prepared to offer 
reasons for their positions or claims, participants have the best chance of truly 
understanding each other and proceeding toward a meaningful consensus. The 
demand for reasons may also help to diffuse situations where a party makes 
powerful and coercive assertions without having to be accountable for them 
through articulation of reasons. Mediators should, then, be adept at asking 
parties to explain their claims, to provide grounding reasons, and to notice and 
point out inconsistencies.56
51.  See Jürgen Habermas, “A Reply to My Critics” in John B Thompson & David Held, eds, 
Habermas: Critical Debate (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1982) 219.
52.  Roger Fisher & William Ury with Bruce Patton, ed, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement 
Without Giving In, 3rd ed (New York: Penguin Publishing, 2011) at 21.
53.  See ibid at 5.
54.  Ibid at 21.
55.  See ibid at 11.
56.  For excellent examples of phrasing that mediators may use in this respect, see Chilton & 
Cuzzo, supra note 39.
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C. Rule Against Compulsion
Compulsion can occur in a mediation context through two sources of 
power exertion. One is rooted in power differentials between the parties. A 
more powerful party may cause a less powerful party to speak less, disagree less, 
and accept a compromise more readily. For instance, in a mediation between an 
employer and an employee, the employee may experience a power differential 
that causes her to agree more readily to certain terms. Second, a mediator may 
exert influence to cause one or both of the parties to accept an agreement. 
Numerous studies suggest that mediators use tactics that pressure parties to 
settle, compromising the principles against compulsion.57
These are challenging concerns, but using dialogue theory as a guiding 
framework for legitimate mediation can be helpful in becoming responsive to 
them. At its core, this framework enables and demands an interpretation of 
successful mediation as one where a fair discourse happened, rather than one 
where a settlement or a compromise was reached, and several important ideas 
that are relevant to concerns around compulsion flow from this approach.
First, it implies mediators must recognize that their primary role is to secure 
a fair dialogue, not to champion a settlement. Along these lines, Bush and Folger 
advocate that mediators must be taught that “the essential role of the mediator 
is to support the parties’ conversation, and their deliberation and decision-
making, rather than to control, guide, or direct it in any way”, and they provide 
practical guidance to that effect.58 Assessing mediation programs must involve 
determining whether mediation training programs expressly emphasize that the 
mediator’s role is to secure a space for a fair dialogue, not to achieve settlement. 
This type of mediator training is imperative if a dialogical approach to mediation 
is adopted. In addition, to continually improve court-annexed mediation, 
empirical inquiries should be made to determine whether parties felt coerced 
during a mediation, whether they felt imposed upon, whether they felt heard 
and respected, and whether they felt truly engaged in an authentic dialogue.59
57.  As noted in the discussion above, Richard Delgado has done work implying that mediators 
function like decision-makers and their prejudicial biases can impact the process—so for 
instance, a person from the dominant group gets to ask more questions, or gets to speak more—
which in terms of the rational discourse frame, hinders condition two of equal communicative 
opportunity. Welsh has described how court-annexed mediation involves mediator tactics that 
pressure parties to settle. See Welsh, “Bankruptcy Mediation”, supra note 27 at 438–39. See also 
Coben & Harley, supra note 27 at 257–58. 
58.  Bush & Folger, “Risks and Opportunities”, supra note 2 at 40 [emphasis in original].
59.  While no empirical studies seem to have focused squarely on the dialogic nature of 
mediation in Canada, some empirical work has been conducted to assess the participants’ 
experience during mediation. See Julie MacFarlane & Michaela Keet, “Civil Justice Reform 
and Mandatory Civil Mediation in Saskatchewan: Lessons from a Maturing Program” (2005) 
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This criterion raises a related question around the propriety or advisability of 
judges acting as mediators. Some empirical evidence suggests that the gravitas 
that judges bring to mediations results in their statements being interpreted as 
essentially authoritative by the parties.60 Given that the primary role of judges 
is to provide statements of legal evaluations of cases (as opposed to facilitating 
open dialogues), it would not be surprising if the endpoint of judicial mediation 
is often an influential comment about the legal merits of each side’s case. On 
the one hand, some may feel that such judicial evaluation would serve as a 
safeguard in mediations since judges are experts in protecting legal rights and 
upholding the rule of law. This view, however, espouses a narrow interpretation 
of both the adjudicative system and the mediation process.
First, in an adjudicative context, the rule of law is not protected only by 
a judge, but also by procedural and structural protections and precautions, 
including the rules of evidentiary disclosure, appeals processes, and public 
accountability. Judicial statements made in a mediation context are, by 
design, not subject to the same procedural demands as they would be in a
litigation context. As a rule, judicial mediations may involve very influential 
statements from the judge, but without the procedural safeguards that help 
to legitimate authoritative judicial outcomes in an adjudicative context. This, 
then, could cause a dangerous compromise to the rule of law, and in particular, 
its procedural aspects.
Moreover, the idea that a judge’s presence in a mediation may help to ensure 
the rule of law or otherwise help to secure “good” outcomes fails to duly recognize 
mediation as a distinct process of dialogue that centralizes self-determination. 
Mediation must not be understood as a sort of “adjudication lite”—a cheaper 
and less robust version of adjudication, where a judge makes a fairly quick call 
about the merits of the case and the advisability of pursuing litigation further. 
Such an interpretation of mediation constitutes a compromise to the dignity of 
the participants in at least two ways. First, it results in a pseudo-authoritative 
judicial statement, but disavails participants of the procedural commitments 
that inhere in legitimate adjudication. Second, it suggests that legal norms 
are necessarily primary, and given their legal expertise, judges know best how 
a dispute should be resolved. This fails to recognize mediation as a unique 
and valuable process because of its commitment to dialogue between parties 
and consensual decision-making. Adopting a dialogue-based framework for 
legitimate mediation could help to avoid these potential pitfalls by invoking a
42:3 Alta L Rev 677. See also Nancy A Welsh, “Magistrate Judges, Settlement, and Procedural 
Justice” (2016) 16:3 Nevada LJ 983, which provides a helpful empirical tool that can (and 
should) be used to assess court-connected mediation programs.
60.  See Coben & Harley, supra note 27; Welsh, “Bankruptcy Mediation”, supra note 27; 
Baruch Bush, supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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paradigmatic shift away from considering mediation as a way to quickly resolve 
disputes, and instead seeing it as a process designed for mutual decision-making 
and problem-solving. This shift should be evident in judicial approaches to 
mediation, as well as in any mediator’s approach to mediation. It should be 
reflected in mediator training and in the participant’s experience.
Another related benefit of recognizing successful mediation as good dialogue 
(rather than achieving a settlement) is that it makes space for parties to be 
supported in their decisions not to settle. Bush and Folger persuasively explain 
that securing the ability to leave a mediation is a significant source of power 
for a party because it prevents them from feeling a compulsion to accept a 
resolution that is not truly acceptable.61 This has implications for both mediators 
and lawyers representing clients in a mediation. When a mediator recognizes 
that there is hesitancy on the part of a party to enter into a settlement, rather 
than encouraging acceptance of the settlement (which would be incentivized 
if the mediator sees settlement as success), the mediator does better when they 
encourage the party to express their concerns that lie beneath that hesitation.62 
Such encouragement supports a genuine dialogue, and empowers parties to a 
far greater extent than attempting to push a party into accepting an agreement. 
Similarly, lawyers must also recognize that their role in a mediation is to assist 
their clients in engaging in an informed dialogue and not to push clients 
toward a particular outcome. This was recently recognized by the Court of 
Queen’s Bench of Alberta in Raichura v Jones, where a lawyer was ordered 
to pay damages for improperly pushing a client into accepting settlement.63
Along with establishing the correct role of the mediator as facilitator of 
dialogue and not champion of settlement, assessing a mediation program 
may also involve considering structural features that would help to secure a 
fair dialogue. For instance, pre-mediation conferences where parties meet the 
mediator and are alerted to the process of mediation would likely support 
dialogical mediation. Parties should be expressly told that the mediator’s role 
is not to protect one side or to secure an outcome for parties that would be 
secured in a court. Rather, the purpose is to facilitate a dialogue between the 
parties to enable them to arrive at a conclusion of their own, if they so wish. 
Parties should be made aware that the purpose of mediation is to provide a space 
to engage in a genuine discourse, to listen to one another, and to raise concerns 
sincerely. They should accept that their propositions may be challenged, that 
inconsistencies in what they say may be brought to light, and that they may be
61.  See Bush & Folger, “Risks and Opportunities”, supra note 2.
62.  See ibid at 43.
63.  2020 ABQB 139. This case is currently under appeal. For a helpful and thoughtful 
commentary, see Deanne Sowter, “Mediation: A Warning Not to Bully a Client Into Settlement” 
(18 September 2020), online: Slaw <www.slaw.ca/2020/09/18/mediation-a-warning-not-to-
bully-a-client-into-settlement/>. 
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asked to articulate why they take certain positions.64 Thereafter, parties should 
be invited to determine whether they feel confident that the mediation program 
is suitable for them.
Conclusion
My primary intention in this paper was to offer a theorization of the 
legitimacy of mediation, which I consider urgent because of how enthusiastically 
mediation has been embraced into civil litigation systems. That embrace has 
been largely underpinned by the value of efficiency; but the legitimacy of legal 
processes requires more grounding than that if we are to ensure that community 
members are treated fairly. Here, I have suggested that an appropriate grounding 
can be found in the values of equality and dignity which also underpin the ideal 
of the rule of law in an adjudicative context. I have suggested that these values 
are at the core of dialogue theory, which can therefore become the scaffolding 
for a theory of legitimate mediation. I have found dialogue theory to be a 
promising model for legitimate mediation because it embodies the core values 
of equality and dignity, while simultaneously centralizing self-determination 
and consensual decision-making, which are key features of mediation.
I wish to reiterate one theme that has emerged through the inquiry presented 
here: the protection of the rule of law, in the sense of ensuring congruence 
between existing laws and their administration by the courts, is only possible 
through adjudication—but this does not imply that mediation is necessarily 
illegitimate. Express recognition of this ensures that the value of adjudication
is never inappropriately minimized and helps to maintain conceptual clarity as 
to the fact that mediation is distinct from adjudication, and the value that it 
brings as a dispute resolution process is unique. That clarity is imperative when 
assessing mediation programs and considering civil procedure reform initiatives 
with respect to mediation.
The key purpose of this paper has been to offer a starting point for a discourse 
around mediation as dialogue. To this end, in the last part of the paper, I 
have offered brief comments that indicate how dialogue theory, particularly 
Habermas’ conditions of rational dialogue, can be used as a framework for 
continual discussion, debate, re-evaluation, and assessment on how to ensure 
a fair and responsive mediation process. I hope that these comments may 
encourage further discussion on how best the theory of dialogue can become 
operationalized within Canadian civil justice. Given the tremendous value 
that mediation as a dispute resolution process can offer, and at the same time 
bearing in mind the potential dangers that inhere in it, I believe that such 
discussion is urgent.
64.  I recognize that asking parties to behave well during a mediation does not guarantee that 
they will. But there is value in setting out the expectations.
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